Iran's Nuclear Program: The Way Out
Time
Tuesday, May. 09, 2006
By Hassan Rohani
A nuclear weaponized Iran destabilizes the
region, prompts a regional arms race, and wastes the scarce
resources in the region. And taking account of U.S. nuclear
arsenal and its policy of ensuring a strategic edge for Israel,
an Iranian bomb will accord Iran no security dividends. There
are also some Islamic and developmental reasons why Iran as an
Islamic and developing state must not develop and use weapons of
mass destruction.
Three years of robust inspection of Iranian
nuclear and non-nuclear facilities by the IAEA inspectors led
Dr. El-Baradi to conclude and certify that to date there are no
indications of any diversion of nuclear material and activities
toward making a bomb. At the same time, El-Baradi has pointed
out that the IAEA cannot certify that Iran's program is
exclusively peaceful. But the fact is that few among many states
with a nuclear program have received such a clean bill of health
from the IAEA. Such certification by the IAEA does and should
take time and effort. Iran is prepared and willing to invest the
time and effort necessary to receive the IAEA clean bill of
health. The IAEA is also ready to pursue its investigation of
Iran's nuclear activities. So should the states that have
concern about it.
What is, then, the motive for the rush to
heighten the situation and create a crisis? Could it be that the
extremists all around see their interests — however transient,
domestic and short-sighted — in heightened tension and crisis?
This situation, if not contained with cool head and if
miscalculations continue, can easily turn into a crisis with
potentially global ramifications for the rule of law under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for the economic and security
interests of all concerned in the region and beyond. It is high
time to cease sensationalism and war mongering, pause and think
twice about where we are heading.
Iran is not accused of having the bomb. There
are no indications that Iran has a nuclear weapon program. If
Iran were to have a weapons program, the alarmists in the U.S.
and Israel have reportedly said that it would take at least
another seven to ten years for Iran to make the bomb. What is
often cited by American officials as 20 years of Iranian secret
nuclear military program turned out to be, as declared by the
IAEA, nothing more than the failure to declare, in a timely
manner, some experiments and receiving some material and
equipment. Such failures to declare are not uncommon among the
NPT members. Remedial steps are envisioned in the Safeguards
Agreement to address them, and Iran has done so. Moreover, it
was no secret that we were in the European, Russian and Asian
markets to purchase enrichment technology in the late '80s and
'90s. Therefore, an Iranian secret weapon program is only hype,
and the sense of urgency about Iran's nuclear program is rather
tendentious. The world should not allow itself to be dragged
into another conflict on false pretenses in this region again.
Iran is intent on producing nuclear fuel
domestically for reasons both historic and long-term economic.
The U.S. and some Europeans argue that they cannot trust Iran's
intentions. They argue that they cannot accept Iran's promise to
remain committed to its treaty obligation once it gains the
capability to enrich uranium for fuel production. They ask Iran
to give up its right under the NPT, and instead accept their
promise to supply it with nuclear fuel. This is illogical and
crudely self-serving: I do not trust you, even though what you
are doing is legal and can be verified to remain legal, but you
must trust me when I promise to do that which I have no
obligation to do and cannot be enforced. It is this simple and
this unfair. There must be a better way out of this than to top
this travesty with threatening Iran in the Security Council with
possible sanctions and perhaps even use of force. This path can
potentially cause harm and suffering at differing degrees to all
parties to the conflict.
A negotiated solution still can and must be
found if we intend to strengthen the non-proliferation regime
and avoid an unwise and unnecessary conflict. To this end, we
must dare to leave the emotions aside and avoid polluting the
atmosphere with the baggage of immediate and long-past history
of Iran-U.S. relations. A solution imposed on Iran by the
Security Council is unlikely to provide the assurances the U.S.
seeks about the Iranian nuclear program. In my personal
judgment, a negotiated solution can be found in the context of
the following steps, if and when creatively intertwined and
negotiated in good faith by concerned officials:
- Iran would make an active
contribution, provided that other countries with similar
sensitive fuel cycle programs also do the same, to fixing
the loopholes in the non-proliferation system and to
developing a technically credible international control
regime.
- Iran would consider
ratifying the Additional Protocol, which provides for
intrusive and snap inspections.
- Iran would address the
question of preventing break-out from the NPT.
- Iran would agree to
negotiate with the IAEA and states concerned about the scope
and timing of its industrial-scale uranium enrichment.
- Iran would accept an IAEA
verifiable cap on enrichment limit of reactor grade uranium.
- Iran would accept an IAEA
verifiable cap on the production of UF6 — uranium
hexafluoride, which is used for enrichment — during the
period of negotiation for the scope and timing of its
industrial scale enrichment.
- Iran and the IAEA would
agree on terms of the continuous presence of inspectors in
Iran to verify credibly that no diversion takes place in
Iran.
- Iran's readiness to
welcome other countries to partner with Iran in a consortium
provides additional assurance about the peaceful nature of
Iran�s nuclear program.
It is not Iran's intention to disregard
Security Council decisions. The way out is for the Security
Council to mandate the IAEA to address this issue and establish
a negotiating process for a fixed period to formulate a credible
plan taking into account the suggestions I made in my personal
capacity.
Iran is prepared to work with the IAEA and all
states concerned about promoting confidence in its fuel cycle
program. But Iran cannot be expected to give in to United
States' bullying and non-proliferation double standards.
Hassan Rohani is representative of the
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, on the Supreme National
Security Council (SNSC) and Iran's former top nuclear negotiator
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